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This paper examines the importance of legal rights and enforcement in influencing 
property-casualty insurance consumption. We extend the existing literature by examining 
the role of legal factors in determining insurance density across countries. Also, measures 
of risk aversion, loss probability and price, which overcome limitations of proxies used in 
the existing literature on insurance demand are analysed. Using a panel data set we apply 
a Generalized Methods of Moments dynamic system estimator, which relaxes the 
assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors and produces unbiased and efficient 
estimates.  The results show a strong positive relationship between the protection of 
property rights and insurance consumption, which is robust to various model 
specifications and estimation techniques. Moreover, the results show the purchase of 
property-casualty insurance is significantly and positively related to loss probability and 













  The relevance of legal rules and their enforcement in explaining the development of 
financial markets and economic growth has recently become the focus of much empirical 
research. Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, (1997, 1998, 2000) examine the 
importance of national legal origin on creditor and shareholder rights, along with the implications 
of creditor, shareholder rights and legal enforcement on external finance. Levine (1998, 1999), 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) extend this research to 
examine the importance of legal systems for economic growth and financial development. An 
important conclusion is that countries with poor legal rules and law enforcement have narrower 
debt and equity markets (see La Porta et al (1997)), and that a well-defined and enforced legal 
system facilitates greater financial intermediation, and thereby economic growth (see Levine et al 
(2000)). 
Since insurance involves the legal transfer of risk, the value of the contract is dependent 
upon legal rules and enforcement, the efficiency of conflict resolution through the judiciary, and 
the stability and integrity of the law making process. Moreover, given that insurers have a 
positive probability of insolvency, insurance liabilities may be viewed as analogous to risky 
corporate debt (see Cummins and Danzen (1997)).
1 Therefore, as in the case of debt and equity 
markets, it is likely that the development of insurance markets and thereby additional financial 
intermediation is also critically dependent upon the quality of the underlying legal system. 
Despite the theoretical importance of the impact of the law and its enforcement on demand for 
insurance, existing empirical research has not examined the extent to which property rights and 
law enforcement affect insurance consumption. This study fills a gap in the literature by  
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providing an analysis of the role of law in explaining the depth and growth of the insurance 
industry across countries. 
In addition, by utilising a larger panel data set comprising of 44 developed and 
developing countries this study extends the work of Browne, Chung, and Frees (2000), Outreville 
(1990, 1996), and Beenstock, Dickinson, and Khajuria (1988).  Beenstock et al. (1988) were the 
first to utilise a panel data set to analyse various elasticities of demand for insurance across 
countries. Outreville (1990, 1996) used a cross sectional sample of emerging markets to examine 
the social and economic determinants of property-liability insurance and life insurance, while 
Browne et al. (2000) employed a panel data set to distinguish between common-law and 
statutory-law systems as a means of determining insurance consumption across OECD countries. 
However, legal system dummy variables were utilised to proxy the probability of loss rather than 
explicitly modelling the impact of the law on insurance demand.  
  The current insurance literature has estimated the determinants of insurance demand 
using either small, single year cross-sectional samples [see Outreville (1990, 1996), Browne and 
Kim (1993), and Beenstock et al. (1988)], or relied upon panel data techniques that do not 
account for the potential endogeneity of the contemporaneous regressors [see Browne et al., 
2000]. This is a potentially important issue, in view of the current literature that indicates 
economic growth can also be assisted by financial development, inclusive of the insurance 
industry
2. Moreover, the existing literature has ignored the process of dynamic adjustment to 
long-run equilibrium, which is central to understanding the long-run effects of changes in legal 
rights and income growth on the development of insurance markets. 
Therefore, to account for the above limitations, this paper contributes to the current 
literature in three ways. Firstly, we incorporate legal factors as possible determinants of property-
casualty insurance (PCI) consumption. Secondly, the empirical analysis includes time series data  
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for 44 countries between the years 1984 to 1998. As well as overcoming the small sample 
limitations of prior studies, the length of the time-series also allows the estimation of a dynamic 
panel data model that can examine short and long-run influences on property-casualty insurance.  
Thirdly we include proxies for price, risk aversion and loss probability, which have not 
previously been utilized in studies of insurance demand. Moreover, by including both 
economically developed and underdeveloped countries, we extend the literature beyond the 
studies of Outreville (1900, 1996) who examined only developing countries, and Browne et al. 
(2000) who focus on OECD countries. 
  In the following section we outline the model, and in Section 3 describe the cross-
sectional and panel data estimation techniques. This is followed by a discussion of the results in 
Section 4, and a conclusion in Section 5. 
 
 2. The Determinants of Property-Casualty Insurance 
(i) Measuring Insurance  
In this paper we model the determinants of property-casualty insurance as a function of 
legal rights and enforcement, economic development, risk aversion, the price of insurance and 
the probability of incurring losses. The dependent variable is defined as real per capita property-
casualty insurance, PCI, and is measured in constant 1995 US dollars. An unavoidable cost of 
including developing countries in the sample, is that the dependent variable aggregates across 
various lines of insurance. This can lead to the problem whereby some lines of insurance are 
more pronounced than others in different countries.  Nevertheless, PCI is dominated by motor 
vehicle and property insurance, which accounts for the majority of the PCI market in the OECD 
countries for which disaggregated data is available and clearly where motor vehicle insurance is  
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mandatory then there is a priori evidence that the legal system supports the contractual transfer 
of risk via insurance.  
Also, a limitation of using premiums to measure insurance output is that premiums can be 
seen to measure revenue (see Yuengert (1993)). Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999) suggest 
the use of the value added approach to defining output. In this approach outputs are measured in 
terms of services provided and include risk transfer, measured by losses paid, and financial 
intermediation, measured by addition to reserves. Unfortunately, the necessity for detailed data 
precludes us from using the value added approach, and we therefore follow the existing insurance 
demand literature by using gross premiums. 
(ii) Legal Origin, Property Rights and Judicial Efficiency 
La Porta et al. (1998) show the origin of a country￿s legal system is related to the level of 
legal protection and enforcement provided to external creditors and shareholders. Their results 
indicate common law countries provide the greatest protection of shareholder and creditor rights, 
while French civil law countries provide the least protection. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1997) 
find that French and Scandinavian legal origin countries have significantly smaller debt markets 
(measured by debt/GNP) relative to countries with English and German legal origins.
3  
  The effect of legal systems on financial development and economic growth has also been 
examined by Levine (1998, 1999) and Levine et al. (2000). These studies use legal system 
variables as instruments to extract the exogenously determined component of financial 
intermediation, and conclude that financial intermediation leads to economic growth. Moreover, 
they show that a well-defined and enforced legal system facilitates greater financial 
intermediation, which leads to economic growth. After controlling for income, Levine (1998) and 
Levine et al. (2000) find that banking and financial intermediary development is significantly  
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greater in countries with German legal origins, with no significant differences between the other 
legal groups. 
The importance of the legal system to the insurance industry stems from the positive 
probability of insurance company insolvency. Since insurance policies may be viewed as 
analogous to risky corporate debt (see Cummins and Danzon (1997)), legal systems that protect 
creditor rights and therefore promote external debt markets, should similarly facilitate insurance 
demand. In order to capture the effect of legal systems on insurance demand, we follow Levine et 
al (2000) and La Porta et al (1997) and include three legal system dummies, ENGLISH, 
FRENCH and GERMAN, with the Scandinavian (SCAND) legal system dummy variable 
excluded.  
In addition to the solvency of the insurance supplier, the value of PCI is directly affected 
by the enforcement of property rights.
4 Property rights provide individuals and firms with the 
right to own and sell assets, and protection against damage or devaluation of such assets by third 
parties. Knack and Keefer (1995, 2000) have shown that the insecurity of property rights reduces 
economic growth, as firms may adopt less than optimal fixed capital assets because of 
expropriation risk, avoid investments in assets that are capital intensive or operate at an 
inefficient scale. In terms of insurance, the enforcement of property rights creates an economic 
incentive to acquire and insure property, since government and legal enforcement of property 
rights help to protect individuals from loss or damage to the asset. 
However, it is also worth noting that there is also the possibility that if property rights are 
well enforced then it may also act as a deterrent to those intending to cause damage and actually 
reduce the demand for first-party insurance. While perhaps at the same time promoting the up 
take of third party liability insurance particularly in economies with strict liability laws.
5.   
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Therefore, although we suspect the influence of property rights to be more likely positively 
related to insurance consumption, we leave it as ambiguous, ex ante, in table 1. 
  As a measure of property rights we use the 50 point property rights index, PROPERTY, 
developed by Knack and Keefer (1995). The index is determined by measuring the general level 
of corruption, rule of law, state bureaucratic quality, the risk of contract repudiation and the risk 
of expropriation, either through outright confiscation or enforced nationalization of property. The 
larger the index, the more property rights are maintained and thereby the greater the potential 
return from insurance. This index is, unlike the legal origin dummy variables, time-varying, 
which allows for its use in a panel regression
6.  
 
(iii) Economic Development 
  The relative importance of the PCI market within a country will also be dependent upon 
economic development. With greater rates of economic growth, consumption of insurance 
products should increase as a result of increased income, and an increased stock of assets 
requiring insurance. Furthermore, the development of insurance is likely to facilitate greater 
economic growth, implying that economic growth may be endogenous. Consistent with these 
arguments, Outreville (1990, 1996) finds the level of financial development and economic 
development are positively related to the level of insurance across emerging markets. Also, Ward 
and Zurbruegg (2000) show for some OECD countries that economic growth and insurance 
market development exhibit a bi-directional relationship.  
To incorporate the link between economic growth and insurance, we use real gross 
domestic product per capita, REALGDP, to measure national income, and expect it to be 
positively related to PCI. 
(iv) Risk Aversion  
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  A primary motive for purchasing insurance is to minimise the damage from an adverse 
event. Unfortunately, measuring attitudes to risk is difficult and in the past most insurance 
studies have used education to proxy risk aversion. According to Outreville (1996), education 
promotes an understanding of risk and hence increased demand for insurance. However Szpiro 
and Outreville (1988) have argued that the more people are educated, the less risk averse they 
become. One reason for this is that improving cognition enables a better assessment of risk. 
Alternatively, increasing education levels are associated with an increase in transferable human 
capital, facilitating greater risk taking by individuals with lower risk aversion. Following 
Outreville (1990) we include EDUCATION, defined as the proportion of the population 
completing secondary education, as a proxy for risk aversion. Although we expect the impact of 
EDUCATION on insurance demand to be positive, we acknowledge Szpiro and Outreville￿s 
(1988) suggestion that a negative relationship may be observed. 
  As an alternative risk aversion proxy, we also use the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 
discussed in Hofstede (1995). Based on survey data, the UAI index is constructed using 
employee attitudes towards the extent to which company rules are strictly followed, the expected 
duration of employment with current employers and the level of workplace stress. The UAI 
ranges from 8 for the lowest uncertainty avoidance country to 112 for the highest uncertainty 
avoidance country in our sample. The UAI was directly promoted as a determinant of the demand 
for insurance by Hofstede (1995) who saw insurance as a product of national values. According 
to Hofstede (1995) it is the cultural unwillingness of a society to deal with uncertainty that in part 
drives a desire to avoid the unknown and seek out insurance. These ideas were formally tested by 
Park, Borde and Choi (2002) who found no statistical relationship between UAI and insurance 
penetration. However, these findings can be considered weak when one notes that the data set 
only consisted of 37 countries for the single time period of 1997.  We therefore intend to provide  
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a more robust test of the relationship between risk aversion and insurance demand, and expect the 
coefficient on the UAI variable to be positively related to insurance consumption. 
(v) The Price of Insurance and Probability of Loss 
  The demand for any product or service is affected by price. We use the inverse of the loss 
ratio, defined as premiums divided by claims, to measure the PRICE of insurance and expect it to 
be negatively related to insurance consumption
7. Cummins and Danzon (1997) use a similar 
measure of price in their study of price determination. However, previous studies of insurance 
demand have either omitted the price variable or used the proportion of foreign insurers in the 
market as a proxy. We believe that the number of insurers in the market may just capture the 
degree of openness within the insurance market and not necessarily the efficiency and costs 
associated with insurance business. 
  To assess the value of insurance, the price of insurance must be jointly considered with 
the probability of incurring a loss. Demand for insurance should be positively related to the 
likelihood of incurring losses due to adverse events. As it is expected that claims due to ￿acts of 
god￿ will be randomly distributed, only losses that are related to socio-economic factors will be 
proxied. 
Two measures are used for this purpose.  The first uses data from the United Nations 
World Crime Surveys.  We include the per capita rate of recorded property theft (THEFT) as a 
proxy for loss probability. Recorded crime does not necessarily indicate the level of crime within 
a state, but the willingness of individuals to report these events. Such willingness will only exist 
if: (i) victims believe there is a possibility of restitution; and (ii) that the police force can be 
trusted and has the resources and motivation to investigate reported crime. Therefore, a country 
where crime is reported will more likely reflect an insurance industry with higher claim rates and  
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consumers more willing to purchase insurance.  Furthermore, crime must obviously be reported 
before an insurance claim can actually be made. 
Unfortunately, not all the countries reported crime rates on a frequent, annual basis to the 
UN World Crime Surveys. Therefore as an alternative to THEFT, the degree of urbanization 
(URBAN) is also used to proxy loss probability.  In urban areas there is a greater concentration 
of assets.  According to Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), these factors lead to increased 
opportunities for crime as well as increased scope for evading detection. In terms of other losses, 
greater concentrations of productive capital and vehicle movements lead to concentrations of risk 
with more activities undertaken in close proximity to each other. We expect both THEFT and 
URBAN to be positively related to PCI. 
A summary of the hypotheses is provided in Table 1.  Data sources and variable 
descriptions are also provided in Appendix 1. 
3. Data And Estimation  
(i) Data   
Table 2 provides unlogged mean, median, standard deviation and number of observations 
for each variable for the full sample and legal origin sub-samples (Scandinavian, English, French 
and German) for the unbalanced panel data set using annual data from 1984 to 1998
8. The 
countries in the sample are listed in Appendix 2.  All countries that Swiss Re had data for at least 
one decade were incorporated into the sample
9.  A potential selection bias does exist as a number 
of smaller insurance markets that do not provide annual reported premiums are excluded.   
However, the countries utilised do represent the most significant nonlife insurance markets by 
density and geographical region. 
In both the full sample and legal origin sub-samples, the data shows no obvious signs of 
skewness, with mean and median values for all variables, excluding the dependent variable,  
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being of similar magnitude.  Across the legal origins some interesting patterns emerge. Countries 
with German and Scandinavian based legal systems have much larger per capita PCI markets 
than English and French based countries. The mean PCI market in countries with German legal 
systems ($682.6 per capita) is more than double that of English based systems ($302.6) and four 
times that of French based legal systems ($170.9). Relative to English and French based 
countries, German and Scandinavian based countries also tend to be richer (higher GDP per 
capita), have lower priced insurance, higher education levels, higher rates of urbanization and 
theft, and  greater protection of property rights.
10 The one exception to this pattern is the level of 
risk aversion proxied by the UAI index, which shows German based countries are most risk 
averse (mean UAI = 76.25) and Scandinavian based countries the least risk averse (mean UAI = 
40.25). Finally, it is worth noting that French based countries have the least developed 
economies, highest priced insurance, lowest level of education and lowest protection of property 
and political rights. 
Correlations are also reported in Table 2. The signs of the correlation coefficients 
between the explanatory and dependent variable are generally consistent with the predictions 
summarized in Table 1. PCI is highly positively correlated with REALGDP (.854), 
EDUCATION (.684), THEFT (.665), and PROPERTY (.745), and negatively correlated with 
PRICE (-.297).  
(ii) Estimation Procedures 
One primary econometric issue that this paper addresses is potential endogeneity.  That is, 
the dependent variable (PCI) may influence the explanatory variables.  As an example, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that the size of the insurance market and its operations may have a direct 
influence upon the economy of a country.  This makes the examination of PCI  econometrically 
difficult, as there is the potential for the endogenous variables to be correlated with the  
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disturbance term.  A common means to overcome this problem is to utilize instrumental 
variables.  These are variables that are correlated with the endogenous variable, but uncorrelated 
with the disturbances.   
For this reason, and as a preliminary measure to analyze the data, instrumental variables 
are applied within a two-stage-least-squares framework (TSLS). Specifically, to account for the 
time-invariant nature of some of the variables, cross sectional estimation is applied where data 
for each country is averaged over the complete sample period, leaving one observation per 
country.  As well as allowing for the inclusion of time-invariant explanatory variables in the 
equation, the averaged cross sectional estimation approach also focuses attention on long-run 
relationships, while also attempting to reduce statistical noise due to short term fluctuations in the 
macroeconomy
11. However, relative to panel data estimation techniques, averaged cross-sectional 
estimation ignores time and country specific effects, as well as providing less efficient estimates 
due to the loss of degrees of freedom from a reduction in the sample size.   
Therefore, to provide a more comprehensive picture of the influence of the explanatory 
variables upon PCI, panel estimation is also conducted. This addresses the problem of 
endogeneity, and by incorporating a lagged term for the dependent variable it is possible to 
examine the dynamic adjustment of the PCI market to long-run levels.  However, standard fixed 
effects estimates are biased and inconsistent when the model includes a lagged dependent 
variable (see for example Verbeck (2000)). 
As a solution, this paper adopts a methodology that has been popular in recent economic 
growth studies, which share similar econometric problems.  Specifically, not only is there a 
problem with accounting for possible endogeneity with some of the explanatory variables (such 
as with the interaction between financial market growth and economic growth) but that 
consideration must also be made for a lagged dependent variable if it is believed that changes to  
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the dependent variable in a previous period may affect the contemporaneous period.  This would 
also generally be the case where in many macroeconomic variables one would expect a degree of 
persistence and inertia to exist [see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000) and Levine, 
Loayza and Beck, 2000).  
The econometric procedure we utilize is referred to as the Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) dynamic system estimator, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995).  The GMM system estimator relaxes the assumption of strict 
exogeneity, (that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with current, future and past values 
of the error term), assuming instead weak exogeneity (that current explanatory variables may be 
affected by past and current values of the dependent variable, but are not affected by future 
changes in the dependent variable). 
  The GMM system estimator applied to panel data with a lagged dependent variable 
involves the simultaneous estimation of the regression equation in differences and levels. For the 
differenced equation, lagged levels of the explanatory variables serve as instruments, and for the 
levels equation differences serve as instruments. To illustrate, consider the following dynamic 
model: 
t i i t i t i t i x y y , , 1 , , ε µ β α + + + = −         ( 1 )  
where  y  is the dependent variable, yi,t-1 is the lagged dependent variable, x is the set of 
explanatory variables, µ is a country specific effect, ε  is the error term, and i and t denote country 
and time periods respectively. 
  Taking first differences of equation (1) eliminates the country effects, µ, but imposes a 
correlation between the differenced error term and the differenced lagged dependent variable, 
resulting in biased estimates when using OLS. Assuming that the error terms are serially 
uncorrelated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, values of y and x lagged  
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two periods or more are valid instruments for the equation in first differences (see Arellano and 
Bond (1991)). The difference equation is: 
yy y y xx it it it it it it it it ,, , , ,, ,, () ( ) ( ) −= − + − + − −− − − − 11 1 2 2 1 1 α β ε ε       (2) 
with the following moment conditions:
  [] Ek s t T k x y it s it it it it ,, , , , () (;, , ; ( , ) ) − ⋅=≥ = = ∆ ε 02 3 L      (3) 
The above GMM estimator based on moment conditions in (3) is known as the difference 
estimator. However, it has been shown by Blundell and Bond (1998) that the difference estimator 
could produce biased and imprecise estimates due to the problem of weak instruments, which 
occurs when the lagged dependent variable is persistent and when the variance of the permanent 
effects increase relative to the variance of the transitory shocks (see also Blundell and Bond 
(1999)). 
  Therefore, given that the correlation between the levels of the explanatory variables and 
the country effects is constant over time, such that: 
  [] [] Ek Ek f o r a l l p a n d q it p i it q i ,, . ++ ⋅= ⋅ µµ         ( 4 )  
results in the additional moment conditions: 
[] Ek s t T k x y it s it i it it it ,, ,, , ()( ; , , ; ( , ) ) − ⋅+ = == = εµ 01 3 L      (5) 
From these additional moment conditions, the levels equation can be estimated with 
lagged first differences of the variables acting as instruments.
12 Using the moment conditions 
given by (3) and (5) the difference and levels equations are jointly estimated with the appropriate 
instruments using GMM. This is known as the GMM system estimator and is shown by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) to provide substantial improvements in terms of bias and precision over the 
single equation difference estimator.  
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  The consistency of the GMM system estimator depends on a number of assumptions. 
Specifically, the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms, and the validity of the 
instruments. Therefore, along with the regression results, diagnostic test results are also provided. 
Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, the test of first order serial correlation of the 
differenced error terms should be significantly negative, and the second order test should be 
insignificant. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is also presented.  This tests for the 
overall validity of the instruments by examining the sample analog of the moment conditions.  
Based on the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (see Arellano and Bond, 1991), failure 
to reject the null hypothesis supports the model specification.
13 
4.  Results 
(i) Cross Sectional Estimation 
  Table 3 presents OLS and TSLS cross-sectional regression estimates of the economic and 
legal determinants of PCI consumption. For TSLS, fitted values of REALGDP are used to 
account for possible endogeneity. These fitted values are calculated by a OLS regression where 
REALGDP is determined to be a function of the consumer price index, budget deficit, black 
market premium, gross investment to GDP, rule of law, democracy, and the explanatory 
variables in the respective insurance regressions
14. 
  In addition to income, we include proxies for risk aversion, loss probability, the price of 
insurance, property rights and the country￿s legal origin. As noted earlier we have two proxies for 
risk aversion (UAI and EDUCATION) and two proxies for loss probability (URBAN and 
THEFT). In regressions 1 and 2 we maximize the data sample by initially using URBAN to 
proxy loss probability and examine the sensitivity of the results to the alternative measures of 
risk aversion. The significant coefficients in regressions 1 and 2 all have the correct sign and 
suggest that PCI is significantly and positively related to income, the probability of incurring  
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losses and the protection of property rights. The two alternative measures of risk aversion, UAI 
and EDUCATION, are correctly signed and close to being significant at the 10% level. 
These results support the hypothesis that increased economic development facilitates 
growth in insurance, either by increasing income which allows for greater insurance 
consumption, and/or by increasing the stock of wealth for which insurance is required. The 
results are also consistent with the hypothesis that greater urbanization is associated with greater 
loss probability and therefore greater demand for insurance. There is also strong support for the 
hypothesis that the enforcement of legal rights, as measured by PROPERTY RIGHTS, are 
important in explaining insurance growth. However, we find no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that a country￿s legal origin affects the development of insurance markets. 
In regressions 3 and 4 we re-estimate the models, but use the THEFT variable to proxy 
loss probability instead of URBAN. A limitation of this approach is that the sample in 
regressions 3 and 4 are limited to 32 countries due to unavailable THEFT data. The effect of 
including THEFT in the model is to substantially weaken the results, with only REALGDP being 
statistically significant in regression 3. The weaker results may be due to the smaller sample size 
and/or the high correlation between THEFT and PROPERTY
15.  In regression 4 we exclude 
PROPERTY from the model and find that THEFT is positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level, indicating that demand for insurance is higher in countries that have higher reported 
crime rates, which is to be expected. 
  To summarize the cross sectional results in Table 3, we find strong and consistent 
evidence that income, property rights, and loss probability directly and significantly affect 
consumption of PCI. However, there is no evidence that PRICE, measured by the loss ratio, risk 
aversion measured by UAI or EDUCATION, or legal origin affects the cross country 
development of property-casualty insurance markets. Given that the legal origin and UAI are  
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unambiguously insignificant then it is reasonable to comment  that the consumption of property 
and casualty insurance is in the main unaffected by cultural and institutional factors.  This 
finding is in accord with the work of Park et al. (2002), and would tend to suggest that the 
development of insurance in such culturally different economies as Italy, UK, and Japan is not 
dependent upon how individuals perceive the value of insurance or the commercial transfer of 
risk. Rather, through property rights it is how technically effective the judiciary are at enforcing 
contracts that is important. Hence, the development of insurance is technically located not 
culturally located. 
(ii) Panel Data Estimation 
  Table 4 provides the results of panel data regression estimates.  There are three regression 
results presented enabling a comparison of the results using different techniques and sample 
estimates.  Specifically, the table includes results from a standard fixed-effects model to provide 
a benchmark for the GMM results and to help determine the consistency of the results from using 
these different statistical techniques. 
  As the panel estimations allow for time-variation, URBAN and UAI cannot be included.  
Moreover, as is common with much of the economic growth literature, we also take the step of 
creating averaged non-overlapping three-year time intervals from the annual data.  There are 
several benefits of doing this. From a statistical viewpoint, averaging helps deal with outliers and 
temporal influences in the results.  However, from an economic perspective the benefits of 
averaging over longer time-intervals helps minimize the influence of the business cycle on some 
or even all of the variables.  Moreover, the effects of inertia from the impact that previous 
economic conditions may bear upon cotemporaneous circumstances are also reduced.   
Nevertheless, in order to provide a measure as to the influence of averaging upon the dataset, 
annual results are also presented for the GMM model.   
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  Reg. 1 reports the results from using the fixed effects model. The fixed effects model 
suggests that REALGDP, PROPERTY and EDUCATION directly affect insurance demand, 
although PRICE(-1)
16 is insignificant. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable has a 
value of 0.258 and is significant at the 5% level. As this value is fairly low it implies that the 
process of adjustment to long-run levels is rapid (over a three year period), with the long-run 
effect of a change in the other determinants of PCI being roughly 1.4 times the short-run impact. 
However, the fixed effects estimator does not account for endogeneity, and is biased and 
inconsistent when a lagged dependent variable is included in the model. 
  The GMM results are reported in regressions 2 and 3.  The specification tests of the 
system estimator reported in the lower panel of Table 5 support the GMM system estimation. In 
all cases the Sargan test cannot reject the hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with 
the error term, supporting the validity of the instruments. Moreover, there is no evidence of 
second order serial correlation, while the first order serial correlation test is negative, though not 
quite significant for Reg. 2
17. Overall, the results support the assumption of no serial correlation 
in the error terms and thereby the consistency of the GMM estimator. 
  The GMM estimates in regressions 2 and 3 include both time and country specific 
dummy variables. As with the fixed effects model, the results suggest that REALGDP and 
PROPERTY directly affect consumption of PCI, indicating that income and property rights are 
the two prominent determinants for PCI. However, in contrast to the earlier results, there is now a 
significant negative price effect and the lagged dependent variable is insignificant, indicating 
instant adjustment to long-run levels, over a three year period  
Finally, in Reg. 3 we examine the sensitivity of our results to using annual data rather 
than non-overlapping three-year averages. This allows us to increase the sample to 418 
observations. Once again the results suggest that REALGDP and PROPERTY are the most  
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important determinants of PCI density across countries. It is also interesting to note that the 
lagged dependent variable is statistically significant in regression 3 and has a coefficient of 
comparable magnitude to that of regressions 1 and 2, given that in this regression annual data is 
used rather than three year averages. 
5. Conclusion 
  The major methodological contribution of this paper is the application of the GMM 
system estimator to a large panel dataset encompassing both developed and developing countries.  
By accounting for the problem of endogeneity and the possibility of dynamic adjustment, a more 
thorough examination of the determinants for global PCI is provided to that of the existing 
literature. While the results of the GMM system estimator are similar to those obtained from 
using OLS or fixed effects estimation techniques, some important differences are observed. The 
most notable difference being that it is only in the GMM results that the price of insurance is 
found to significantly negatively related to insurance consumption.  
This study also provides the first empirical test of the influence of legal origin and the 
protection of property rights on property-casualty insurance. The importance of the legal 
environment for insurance arises from the positive probability of insurer insolvency, and 
secondly from the enforcement of property rights. Both factors aid the development of insurance 
markets through a lowering of transaction costs associated with contractually transferring risk.  
We find strong support for a direct relationship between property rights and the level of 
insurance density across countries. Moreover, the results suggest that after controlling for 
variation in income and property rights, a country￿s legal origin does not affect insurance 
demand. 
For policymakers, it is important to note that while Levine et al. (2000) suggest that 
banking sector development is conditional on a number of characteristics from the legal  
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environment including legal origin and creditor rights, this study indicates that the linkage 
between insurance and the legal environment appears to be more focused on the single issue of 
enforcing property rights. As a consequence, the legal environment promotes the demand for 
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•  Correlation with the dependent variable PCI 
•  Note: The summary statistics are raw figures and are not logged. 
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Table 3 
The Determinants of Property-Casualty Insurance:  
Cross Sectional Results
 a, b. 
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a. White adjusted ￿p￿- values in brackets. 
b. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
c Specification tests are Sargan tests for the validity of the choice of the instrumental variables. It is 
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All regressions incorporate time and country dummies. 
a. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
b There is a loss of one country from the sample (Brazil) as a result of the lagging procedure involved 
in the estimation of Reg. 2. 






VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
PCI  The log of the ratio of property-casualty 
premiums to the population level deflated by the 





REALGDP  The log of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita deflated by the terms of trade index and 
defined in constant 1995 US dollars. 
 
World Bank 
PRICE  Defined as premiums divided by claims.  AXCO and 
various national 
insurance bodies. 
EDUCATION  The log of the proportion of the population 




UAI  Uncertainty Avoidance Index  Hofstede (1995) 
URBAN  The log of the proportion of the population living 
in urban areas. 
 
World Bank 
THEFT  Defined as the number of property thefts per 
100000 persons.  
 





Equal to one if the country￿s legal system has 
respectively either an English (French, German or 
Scandinavian) legal system and zero otherwise. 
 
La Porta et al 
(1998) 
PROPERTY  50 point property rights index combining 
corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, 
contract repudiation and expropriation risk. The 
higher the index the greater the protection of 
property rights. 
 





Countries in the Sample 
 
   
     
Algeria
ac France  Mexico
a South  Africa 
Argentina
a  India Morocco  South  Korea
a 
Australia Indonesia  Netherlands  Spain 
Austria Iran  New  Zealand  Sweden 
Belgium Ireland  Nigeria
a Switzerland 
Brazil
ac Israel  Norway  Thailand 
Canada Italy  Pakistan
a Tunisia
ab 
Colombia Japan  Panama  Turkey 
Denmark Kenya
a Philippines  United  Kingdom
a 
Egypt Kuwait
ab Portugal  United  States 
Finland Malaysia  Singapore  Venezuela 
 
a Indicates exclusion from regressions containing the variable THEFT. 
b Indicates exclusion from regressions containing the variable BANK. 
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1 By extending standard option models for the pricing of risky corporate debt, Cummins and Danzen (1997) 
develop and empirically test a model of price determination in insurance markets, which assumes insurers are 
subject to insolvency risk. They find the price of insurance is positively related to the financial quality of the 
insurer, reflecting the lower insolvency risk of the insurer. 
 
2 See Levine and Zervos (1998) for how financial markets contribute to economic development. Ward and 
Zurbruegg (2000) and Catalan, Impavido, and Musalem (2000) focus on evidence from the insurance market. 
 
3 In addition to the legal dummies their model includes GDP growth, log GNP and rule of law. When creditor 
rights is included in the regression, the French Legal origin dummy is insignificant. 
4 A third legal influence on insurance demand is highlighted by Browne et al (2000), who argue that liability 
insurance is greater in countries where dispute resolution is more likely to involve litigation and the associated 
granting of financial damages.  
 
5 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
 
6 Average standard deviation across countries on an annual basis is 3.32 points.  
 
7 The loss ratio may also have a negative relationship with premiums if insurers increase their excess levels in 
response to problems with adverse selection of customers.  This can lead to a reduction of the number of claims 
relative to premium income. 
 
8 Although the number of observations varies by variable on an annual basis, we report the data for all available 
annual observations, rather than for a constant sample. This is because data averaging allows for missing 
observations in the annual data series.  
 
9 Germany was excluded from the sample due to the structural and statistical effects reunification had on the 
data. 
 
10 It is interesting to note that the more developed countries have the highest reported theft rates. This is most 
likely from the incentive to report crime in developed countries being greater due to a better protection of 
property rights, and the likelihood that crime needs to be reported in order for insurance claims to be made. 
11 Averaged cross-sectional estimation is common in the economic growth literature (see for example Beck et al. 
(2000) and Levine et al. (2000)). In the insurance literature single year cross sectional estimation has been 
applied by, among others Outreville (1990, 1996) and Browne and Kim (1993). 
12 Additional lagged differences are considered redundant (see Arellano and Bover (1995)). 
13 We use the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) for Ox program written by Doornik, Bond and Arellano (1999) to 
implement the GMM system estimator.  The full set of recommended instruments (see Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
were applied for the GMM estimation results. 
14 The results of the structural equations are available from the authors.  The source for the macroeconomic data 
is the World Bank.  
 
15 The correlation between THEFT and PROPERTY is 0.68.  Although not excessively large it is the highest 
correlation recorded for any of the variables in the sample of 32 countries. 
 
16 We use the one period lag of the price variable under the assumption that prices are dependent upon historical  
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losses.  
 
17 Lack of both first and second order serial correlation in the differenced residual is consistent with the level 
residual following a random walk (see Arellano and Bond (1991)). 